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ABSTRACT 
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction may be given in different ways. One option is for the host state to 
offer its consent to ICSID by way of its national legislation. The aim of this article is to discuss 
how a domestic provision granting jurisdiction to ICSID ought to be interpreted. The article first 
describes the requirements for consent to ICSID arbitration and examines the specific challenges 
posed by domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID. It then analyses consent clauses 
contained in investment laws of several states, with reference to relevant arbitral decisions. Finally, 
it turns to the issue of interpretation of such consent clauses. In this regard, the article discusses 
the possible role that the IDC 'Guiding Principles' on unilateral declarations of states of 2006 
might play in interpreting domestic provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before ICSID. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES wishing to open their economies to foreign 
capital often enact domestic laws (typically a foreign investment law or investment 
code) aimed at granting foreign investors standards of protection. In fact, in the 
last decades most developing countries and economies in transition have adopted, 
and sometimes revised and amended, such laws.1 These domestic laws have the 
same goal as investment treaties, i.e. to encourage private companies to invest in 
the host state and to allay their possible fears about the presence of an unstable 
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 The most complete collection of domestic investment laws can be found in Investment Laws of the World, 
published by ICSID starting from 1973. 
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and unpredictable legal framework for their investments. Similarly to investment 
treaties, investment laws generally begin by defining terms such as 'investment' 
and 'investor'. They then contain a central part about substantive standards of 
treatment: the host state usually grants investors fair and equitable treatment, 
national and most-favoured-nation treatment, protection from arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures, protection from nationalisation and expropriation, and 
the right to free transfer of their capital. Familiar formulas (such as 'prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation') are also at times present. The final part of 
a domestic investment law, again paralleling investment treaties, normally deals 
with the settlement of disputes between the host state and the foreign investor, 
and includes references to domestic courts and/or to investor-state arbitration. 
While in their goals and basic structure investment laws are akin to bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) or multilateral treaties, these laws raise certain 
particular problems connected with the fact that they contain assurances given 
by host states unilaterally to every possible foreign investor. This article intends to 
address a specific aspect concerning domestic investment laws: the issue of the 
state's consent to arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which may be included amongst the guarantees 
granted to investors by host states in their domestic laws. As will be seen 
throughout this work, consent to ICSID arbitration can also be established where 
a foreign investor accepts a unilateral offer made by a state party to the ICSID 
Convention through its domestic investment legislation. Since consent is the 
cornerstone of the Centre's jurisdiction, any arbitral tribunal must approach the 
task of ascertaining the existence of such consent with great care. 
The topic of consent to ICSID arbitration contained in domestic investment 
laws has been relatively scarcely explored by international investment law scholars, 
especially compared to the ever-growing number of articles and monographs 
devoted to BITs and multilateral treaties. This appears somewhat surprising if one 
considers that several jurisdictions include references to ICSID in their respective 
investment laws. In this context, the scope of the state's consent may be ambiguous, 
providing potential grounds for the respondent's objections to jurisdiction. A 
renewed interest in provisions of this type has arisen as a result of recent ICSID 
proceedings commenced by a number of foreign investors against Venezuela, 
based, exclusively or partially, on Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law.2 On 10 
2
 The cases of Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, 
ConocoPhillips Co. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30 and CEMEX Caracas 
Investments BV and CEMEX Caracas II Investments BVv. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 
08/15, are based on relevant BITs, as well as on art. 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law, which 
contains a reference to ICSID arbitration. Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law, art. 22 appears to be the 
only jurisdictional basis in Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/3. See Victorino Tejera Perez, 'Do Municipal Laws Always Constitute a Unilateral Offer to 
Arbitrate? The Venezuelan Investment Law: A Case Study' in I. Laird and T. Weiler (eds.), Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and International Law (2009), vol. II, p. 85 at p. 91. See also, Opic Karimum Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14 and Tidewater Inc. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/5, both recently filed with ICSID, which appear to be based, exclusively or partially, on 
art. 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law. See also infra n. 43. 
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June 2010, the ICSID tribunal in the Mobil v. Venezuela case was the first to rule on 
the issue of consent to ICSID arbitration based on that controversial domestic 
provision, followed, on 30 December 2010, by the tribunal in Cemex v. Venezuela.3 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part II first describes, in general terms, the 
requirements for consent to ICSID arbitration and then turns to examining the 
challenges posed by domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID. Part 
III surveys investment laws of several states and tries to identify patterns in the 
consent clauses contained therein. Where applicable, reference is made to past 
relevant arbitral decisions which had the opportunity to review such clauses. 
Finally, Part IV seeks to determine how a domestic provision granting jurisdiction 
to ICSID ought to be interpreted. In this regard, the article discusses the possible 
role that the 'Guiding Principles' on unilateral declarations of states, approved in 
2006 by the International Law Commission (ILC), might play in interpreting 
domestic provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before ICSID. Possible inter-
pretative solutions derived from those guidelines are juxtaposed to the approach 
taken by arbitral tribunals on the issue of interpretation of consent clauses. Lastly, 
the importance of good faith and investors' legitimate expectations in relation to 
the interpretation of consent to ICSID is analysed. 
II. C O N S E N T T O ICSID A R B I T R A T I O N 
Like any form of arbitration, ICSID arbitration is always based on consent of 
both parties.4 The Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development which accompanies the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
('ICSID Convention') defines consent of the parties as 'the cornerstone of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre'.5 The Preamble of the ICSID Convention mentions the 
requirement of consent twice6 and makes clear that no contracting state shall, by 
the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention, be 
deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to arbitration.7 
3
 Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
10 June 2010; CEMEX Caracas Investments BV and CEMEX Caracas II Investments BVv. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 December 2010. Judge Gilbert 
Guillaume was the President of both arbitral tribunals. 
4
 See Christoph Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn, 2009), pp. 190-192; Aron 
Broches, 'The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction' in 
(1996) 5 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 263; Georges Delaume, 'Consent to ICSID Arbitration' in 
J. Norton et al. (eds.), The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: A Tribute to the Late Kenneth 
R. Simmonds (1998), p. 155 at p. 156. 
5
 See Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, para. 23, available at http:/' 
icsid.worldbank.org. 
6
 See Preamble to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 18 March 1965, (1965) 4 ILM 524. 
7
 Ibid. ('Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of 
this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration'). 
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Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which is the first provision of the 
Convention's Chapter devoted to the jurisdiction of the Centre, requires that the 
agreement to arbitrate between the host state and the foreign investors be 'in 
writing'. The first sentence of that Article reads: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting 
State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. 
It is customary to say that consent to ICSID arbitration may be given in 
three different ways.8 First, the agreement between the parties recording consent 
to ICSID arbitration may be achieved through a compromissory clause in an 
investment agreement between the host state and the investor submitting future 
disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre (or through a compromis, if the dispute 
has already arisen). A second method to give consent to ICSID jurisdiction is 
through a treaty (bilateral or multilateral) between the host state and the investor's 
state of nationality, containing an ICSID arbitration clause. As a third option, 
states may offer their consent to ICSID jurisdiction by way of their national 
legislation. 
While the practice of the last decades incontrovertibly shows a predominance 
of cases brought to ICSID through arbitration clauses contained in a BIT or in 
an investment agreement,9 it has always been undisputed, since the very esta-
blishment of the Centre, that consent could take the form of an acceptance by a 
foreign investor of an offer made by a state party to the ICSID Convention in its 
own investment legislation.10 The already mentioned Report of the Executive 
Directors accompanying the Convention, while not mentioning consent contained 
in a treaty, clearly envisages the possibility for a state to 'offer' to submit disputes 
to ICSID in its domestic statutes: 
Nor does the Convention require that the consent of both parties be expressed in a single 
instrument. Thus, a host State might in its investment promotion legislation offer to submit 
disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the 
investor might give his consent by accepting the offer in writing.11 
8
 See extensively, Schreuer et at., supra n. 4 at pp. 192-217; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law (2008), pp. 238-253. 
9
 According to statistics provided by the ICSID Secretariat, the legal basis invoked to establish the jurisdiction 
of the Centre in cases registered as of 30 June 2010 has been a clause contained in a BIT (63% of the 
registered cases), a clause contained in a multilateral treaty, such as NAFTA or the Energy Charter Treaty 
(10%), an arbitration clause in an investment agreement (22%) and a provision contained in the host state's 
legislation (5%). See The ICSID Caseload: Statistics (2010), no. 2, p. 10, available at http^icsid.worldbank.org. 
However, according to the same report, there has been a remarkable rise in ICSID registered cases based on 
the host state's investment legislation (10%) in the period between 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010. See ibid. p. 20. 
0
 See Schreuer et al, supra n. 4 at pp. 196-205; Delaume, supra note 4 at pp. 161-164. According to Jan 
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity' in (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Inv. LJ 232 at p. 234, 'the principle 
that national investment laws may create compulsory arbitration without privity is beyond cavil'. 
1
 Report of the Executive Directors, supra n. 5 at para. 24. 
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When referring to those two different methods of expressing consent to 
arbitration (through a treaty and through domestic legislation), Jan Paulsson, in 
an article published in 1995 in the ICSID Review, famously coined the term 
'arbitration without privity', that is, arbitration 'where the claimant need not have 
a contractual relationship with the defendant'.12 
Let us briefly examine how such consent comes into existence in the event of 
an offer by the state contained in its own laws. The perspective is, at the end of 
the day, the traditional offer-acceptance method, derived from the contractual 
world. In fact, in order to amount to a consent agreement, the offer contained in 
national legislation must be accepted by the investor. This can be done by simply 
instituting arbitral proceedings.13 The creation of such a bond between the will of 
the state and that of the claimant is not very different from the situation which 
arises when the investor avails itself of an arbitration clause contained in a treaty 
which has been entered into by the host state and the investor's state of 
nationality. In both cases, the investor may wait until a dispute has arisen to 
announce its intention to resort to arbitration. However, consent to arbitration is 
obviously much more precarious when contained in a domestic statute than it is 
when included in a treaty. In the first case, the state may amend the law (or 
abrogate it) unilaterally at any time, thus withdrawing its offer to arbitrate, 
whereas in the latter case it needs the other state's consent to do so. That is why 
investors are advised to accept in writing the offer contained in the host state's 
legislation even before the dispute arises.14 If the legislation embodying an offer to 
adjudicate disputes before ICSID is repealed before consent is perfected (because 
the investor has not instituted arbitral proceedings yet nor notified its acceptance 
in writing at an earlier stage), then the investor loses the possibility of resorting to 
ICSID in the future.15 This shows once again the higher volatility of an offer to 
arbitrate included in a domestic statute as compared to one contained in a BIT. 
12
 See Paulsson, supra n. 10 at p. 232. 
13
 See Schreuer et at, supra n. 4 at pp. 202-205. See also, Tradex Hellas (Greece) v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 1996, (1999) 14 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Imi. LJ 161 at 
pp. 186-187 (where the arbitral tribunal noted that 'although consent by written agreement is the usual 
method of submission to ICSID jurisdiction, it can now be considered as established and not requiring 
further reasoning that such consent can also be effected unilaterally by a Contracting State in its national 
laws, the consent becoming effective at the latest if and when the foreign investor files its claim with ICSID 
making use of the respective national law'); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, (1999) 14 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Inv. LJ 251 at 
p. 266, para. 44 (where the arbitral tribunal noted that 'ICSID practice also indicates that the exchange of 
written consents required for ICSID jurisdiction can be satisfied not only by the mutual acceptances of 
bilateral investment treaties, but also by other forms of acceptances. Many investment laws of developing 
countries provide for the State's acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction (or for alternative dispute resolution 
methods) for disputes with the investor arising out of a particular investment. Under some laws the offer is 
deemed to be accepted as soon as the foreign investor files an investment application pursuant to such a law, 
regardless of whether the application includes a reference to the arbitration provision contained in the law'). 
14
 See Schreuer et al, supra n. 4 at p. 203. 
15
 But see Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri AS v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, paras. 332-336 (where the tribunal discussed its jurisdiction on the 
basis of the host state's legislation, which had been repealed, and noted that it was 'well established in 
international law that a State may not take away accrued rights of a foreign investor by domestic legislation 
abrogating the law granting these rights'). 
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In fact, even in the event of a unilateral denunciation of the treaty by the host 
state (which is usually possible, and which is not unknown in practice),16 investors 
having already made their investment continue to enjoy the rights granted to 
them by the treaty for a certain number of years following denunciation.17 The 
situation is different with domestic legislation. Except for the (in any event 
arguable) case where the repealed domestic law was by its own terms formulated 
so as to 'freeze' die rights granted to investors for a certain number of years 
(similarly to what happens with contractual 'stabilisation clauses'), it would seem 
hard for an ICSID tribunal to accept jurisdiction if no consent has been perfected 
at the time when the law was in force. 
Once consent is perfected through the investor's acceptance, it becomes irrevo-
cable. Article 25(1), last sentence, of the ICSID Convention provides to mis effect: 
When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 
Thus, if the investor has accepted the offer in writing during the legislation's 
lifetime, '[t]he consent agreed to by the parties ... becomes insulated from the 
validity of the legislation containing the offer'.18 
III. THE VARIETY OF LANGUAGE IN DOMESTIC 
INVESTMENT LAWS 
The above-described hallmarks generally concern consent to ICSID jurisdiction 
perfected through the acceptance of an offer contained in a domestic law. The 
situation is, however, more complicated, because the conclusion that a host state 
has consented to ICSID jurisdiction by way of its own legislation is only the 
outcome of a process of interpreting the wording of mat particular law. 
An analysis of dozens of investment promotion laws shows not only that there is 
great variety in die wording of the dispute settiement clauses, but also that very few 
contain an unequivocally worded offer by the host state to arbitrate before ICSID.19 
Before embarking upon a survey of the most frequent patterns found in 
investment promotion laws, it is worth noting that in 1968, ICSID itself 
elaborated certain 'model clauses' that it offered as samples to states and 
investors.20 Those model clauses are mainly meant to be inserted in investment 
contracts and range from a very basic compromissory clause to more elaborate 
provisions concerning the applicable law of the investment agreement, the rules 
16
 For example, in 2008 Venezuela terminated the BIT entered into with the Netherlands. See Luke Eric 
Peterson in 1(1) Investment Arbitration Reporter, 16 May 2008, available at www.iareporter.com. 
17
 See Laurence Heifer, 'Exiting Treaties' in (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1579 at p. 1625. 
18
 See Schreuer et al, supra n. 4 at p. 259. 
19
 One of the first analyses of dispute settlement provisions in domestic laws can be found in Antonio Parra, 
'Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment' in (1997) 12 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Inv. LJ 287. 
20
 See Model Clauses Recording Consent to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Setdement of 
Investment Disputes (1968) 7 ILM 1159. 
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of procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal, the powers of such a tribunal, 
and the allocation of costs of the proceedings. As far as domestic laws are 
concerned, ICSID included among those clauses one which was specifically 
addressed to the event where a host state wishes to include in its legislation an 
offer to arbitrate disputes before ICSID.21 In 1981 and 1993, the model clauses 
were revised.22 This time, all model clauses concerned contractual undertakings 
between state and foreign investor, and no clause specifically envisaged for 
domestic legislation was included. It must be noted that these model clauses 
adopted by ICSID have neither binding force towards states, who remain free to 
draft their dispute settlement provisions as they wish, nor even any 'interpretative' 
value (meaning that only a provision which is similar to the model clause 
proposed by ICSID would embody state consent to arbitration). Such clauses are 
mere suggestions offered by ICSID for the convenience of states and private 
investors. As the commentary accompanying the 1993 model clauses highlights, 
'[t]he only formal requirement that the Convention establishes with respect to the 
consent of the parties is that such consent be in writing ... Nor is any special form 
of words required. The following clauses thus are intended merely as models. 
Actual clauses will vary in substance and terminology according to the 
circumstances of each case'.23 
As already mentioned, states over the years have used very different formu-
lations in drafting dispute setdement provisions in their investment laws. The 
following analysis shows, however, that certain patterns can be recognised.24 
A number of domestic laws do not allow recourse to arbitration, but merely 
provide for setdement of disputes dirough the host state's domestic courts.25 
Other laws generically refer to 'international arbitration', to which the parties 
have to agree.26 In other cases, the law simply 'reminds' of die fact tiiat bilateral 
or multilateral treaties, to which die host state is a party, may provide for 
21
 Model Clause Ha reads: 'The Government of [name of Contracting State] hereby consents to submit to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter the "Centre"), for settlement by 
[conciliation]/[arbitration]/[conciliation followed, if the dispute remains unresolved within [time limit] of the 
communication of the report of the Conciliation Commission to the parties, by arbitration] pursuant to the 
Convention on the Setdement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(hereinafter the "Convention"), all disputes arising out of any investment made, by a national of another 
Contracting State (as defined by the Convention), pursuant to this [Law]/[Decree], provided that the 
investor files a similar consent in writing with [name of official or office], and complies with the following 
additional conditions ...'. 
22 ICSID Model Clauses July 1981), 1 ICSID Rep. 197; ICSID Model Clauses (1 February 1993), 4 ICSID 
Rep. 357. 
23 I C S I D M o d e l Clauses (1 Feb rua ry 1993), supra n . 22 at p . 359 . 
24
 Most dispute setdement clauses, for example, refer to the making of efforts to reach an amicable setdement 
through negotiations between investors and host state before recourse to arbitration is possible. 
25
 See e.g., art. 24 of die Law of the Republic of Armenia on Foreign Investments, 31 July 1994, Investment Laws 
of the World, ICSID Release 95-3, issued June 1995. 
26
 See e.g., art. 22 of Estonian Law on Foreign Investments, 11 September 1991, Investment Laws of the World, 
ICSID Release 94-4, issued July 1994; art. 32(4) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia concerning 
Investment (Law No. 25 of 2007, 15 May 2007), Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 2008-2, issued 
July 2008; art. 42 of the Law of Azerbaijan Republic on Protection of Foreign Investments (No. 57, dated 15 
January 1992, as amended by Law No. 97, dated 7 April 1992), Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 
2004-1, issued March 2004. 
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arbitration.27 It is obvious that reference to arbitration in these cases is purely 
declaratory and does not add anything to the fact that the investor may have a 
right to resort to arbitration pursuant to a BIT or multilateral treaty. 
A considerable number of laws make reference to ICSID jurisdiction or ICSID 
arbitration. This happens in many different ways.28 
At one end of the spectrum are domestic laws clearly containing a standing 
offer by the state to submit disputes to ICSID. This is the case when the piece 
of legislation uses formulations such as 'the host state hereby consents' or 'the 
consent of the host state is constituted by this article'.29 Such crystal-clear 
language leaves no room for doubt. For example, article 8(2) of Albania's Foreign 
Investment Law of 1993 provides that 'the foreign investor may submit the 
dispute for resolution, and the Republic of Albania hereby consents to submission 
thereof, to [ICSID]'. This provision was at issue in the Tradex Hellas v. Albania 
case.30 The ICSID tribunal found that Albania had 'unambiguously' consented 
to the jurisdiction of the Centre by way of that legislative provision.31 
27
 See e.g., art. 43 of Algeria's Investment Law No. 93-12, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 95-1, issued 
January 1995; art. 10 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Guarantees and Measures to Protect 
Foreign Investors' Rights, 30 April 1998, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 98-2, issued November 
1998; art. 22 of Ethiopia's Investment Proclamation No. 37/1996, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 
99-1, issued May 1999; art. 11 of Guatemala's Foreign Investment Law (Decree No. 9-98) of 3 March 1998, 
Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 99-1, issued May 1999; art. 9 of the Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on Investments (8 January 2003, No. 373-11 3PK), Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 2004-
1, issued March 2004. 
28
 It has to be noted that a number of legislative provisions referring to ICSID also contain a separate clause 
referring to the Additional Facility, in case the investor does not meet the nationality requirements of Art. 25 
of the ICSID Convention. These provisions are aimed at opening access to ICSID for those foreign investors 
whose home states are not yet contracting parties to the Convention. 
29
 See e.g., art. 5 of Togo's Investment Code (Law No. 89-22 of 31 October 1989), Investment Laws of the World, 
ICSID Release 2009-1, issued March 2009 ('Le consentement des parties a la competence du CIRDI requis 
par les instruments le regissant, est constitue en ce qui concerne la Republique togolaise par le present article 
et, en ce qui concerne la personne interessee, est exprime dans la demande d'agrement') [The consent of the 
parties to the jurisdiction of ICSID, required by the instruments governing it, is, for the Republic of Togo, 
made up of this article, and, for the concerned entity, is contained in its application for approval]); art. 21 of 
Mali's Law No. 91-048/AN-RM of 26 February 1991 Bearing on Investment Law, Investment Laws of the 
World, ICSID Release 2000-2, issued November 2000 ('The consent [to ICSID arbitration] is made up of 
this article, as far as the government is concerned; it is expressly set out in the application for approval, as far 
as investors are concerned'); art. 24 of Law No. 95-620 of 3 August 1995 on the Investment Code of the 
Republic of Cote d'lvoire, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 97-2, issued October 1997 ('The 
consent of the parties with regard to the competence of the ICSID or of the Supplementary mechanism, as 
the case may be, required by the instruments governing them, shall, for the Republic of Cote d'lvoire, be 
constituted by this article and is expressly contained in the approval application for the entity concerned'); 
art. 38 of the Code des Investissements of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Law No. 004/2004 of 21 
February 2002), Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 2004-2, issued November 2004 ('Le consentement 
des parties a la competence du CIRDI ou du Mecanisme Supplemental, selon le cas, requis par les 
instruments les regissant, est constitue en ce qui concerne la Republique Democratique du Congo par le 
present article et en ce qui concerne l'investisseur par sa demande d'admission au regime de la presente loi 
ou ulterieurement par acte separe') [The consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of ICSID or of the 
Additional Facility, as the case may be, required by the instruments governing them, is made up of this 
article, as far as the Democratic Republic of Congo is concerned, and is contained in the application for 
approval under this law or in a further distinct act, as far as the investor is concerned]. 
30
 Tradex Hellas v. Albania, supra n. 13 at pp. 171-178 (reproducing Albania's Foreign Investment Law of 1993). 
31
 Ibid. pp. 186-187. 
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Even in the absence of such explicit statements of consent by the state, the offer 
to submit disputes to ICSID may nonetheless result from phrases which are worded 
so as to grant investors an unrestricted and unequivocal right to submit a dispute 
to ICSID. This was, for example, the case of Georgia's and El Salvador's Foreign 
Investment Laws, which were examined by the two ICSID tribunals in %hinvali v. 
Georgia32 and in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador33 respectively. Both tribunals 
found that the relevant piece of legislation embodied state consent to ICSID.34 
At the opposite end of the spectrum stand those likewise clear formulations 
which, despite mentioning ICSID, unambiguously require a further ad hoc consent 
between the parties before the dispute can be brought before that forum. 
Language varies: the legislation may point to ICSID jurisdiction, but only 'upon 
express agreement of both parties' or 'as may be mutually agreed by the parties';35 
or it may require that consent to ICSID be contained in the relevant concession 
agreement between the state and the foreign investor.36 Such laws evince that the 
state wishes to reserve a margin of discretion as to the choice of going to 
arbitration, with the consequence that the investor has no right to start arbitral 
proceedings direcdy before ICSID, unless the state has expressly consented to 
that forum in a compromissory clause or a compromis. For example, Tanzania's 
Investment Act of 1997 provides that disputes with foreign investors may be 
submitted to arbitration, including ICSID, 'as may be mutually agreed by the 
parties'.37 The arbitral tribunal in Biwater Gauffv. Tanzania correctly found that 
such a provision did not embody a 'standing unilateral offer' to arbitrate by 
Tanzania, but that a subsequent, separate ad hoc consent was required.38 The 
tribunal emphasised that the language 'as may be mutually agreed by the parties' 
was an insurmountable obstacle to finding a standing unilateral offer to arbitrate 
which could be simply accepted by the investor.39 
In between these two poles (clear offer by the state, on the one hand, and 
further manifestation of consent of the parties, on the other), there is a vast grey 
area of domestic laws distinguished by unclear and imprecise formulations. These 
are the instances which are most likely to raise doubts as to whether or not the 
state has expressed its consent to arbitration. These are also the cases which will 
likely be debated at the jurisdictional phase of an arbitration, and which will 
therefore require careful interpretation. 
32 Zninl!aliD^lopmentLtdv. Republic of Georgia, I C S I D Case N o . A R B / 0 0 / 1 , Award , 2 4 J a n u a r y 2003 , 10 I C S I D 
Rep. 3. Article 16 of Georgia's Investment Law is reproduced at para. 337 of the award. 
33
 Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL v. Republic of El Salvador, I C S I D Case N o . A R B / 0 3 / 2 6 , Award , 2 August 2006, available 
at httpi/ 'ita.law.uvic.ca. Article 15 of the Investment Law of El Salvador is reproduced at para . 268 of the award. 
34
 See ZJiinvali v. Georgia, supra n . 32 at paras . 3 2 8 - 3 4 2 ; Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador, supra n . 33 at pa ra . 332. 
35
 See e.g., art. 25(2) of Mozambique's Law on Investment No. 3/93 of 24 June 1993, Investment Laws of the World, 
ICSID Release 2004-1, issued March 2004. 
36
 See art. 27(2) of Slovenia's Foreign Investments Law 1988, as amended 1993, Investment Laws of the World, 
ICSID Release 95-3, issued June 1995. 
37
 See art. 23(2) of the Tanzania Investment Act, 9 September 1997, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 
99-1, issued May 1999. 
38
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In this category of unclear formulations there are first of all instances where 
reference to ICSID appears to be only for 'didactic' purposes. In other words, the 
host country's legislator simply informs possible foreign investors that the state is 
a party to the ICSID Convention.40 It might be wondered what the significance 
of a reference to ICSID of this kind, devoid of any actual commitment to consent 
to arbitration, can be, since the information that a state is a party to the ICSID 
Convention can easily be found on sources available to everyone.41 The possible 
argument, which a foreign investor might be tempted to make in an arbitral 
proceeding, that there would be no point in referring to ICSID other than to 
consent to international arbitration appears, however, untenable. In Biwater Gauff, 
the tribunal addressed that argument and convincingly observed that: 
Given that one of the contracting parties will be a State, there are many reasons why its options 
for future agreements might be carefully defined and delimited in advance. Section 23.2 [of 
Tanzania's Foreign Investment Law] clears the way for the State to conclude specific types of 
dispute resolution agreement, without internal issues such as ultra vires arising, and as such it 
provides a degree of certainty for investors.42 
It may be added that such a signal sent by the state to potential foreign 
investors is even more meaningful if the state at issue has been historically hostile 
to international arbitration as a means of resolving disputes with private companies. 
The major difficulties arise in diose cases where the domestic law refers to 
ICSID in more mandatory but nonetheless vague terms, by stating, for instance, 
that disputes will be resolved 'within the framework' of ICSID, or by appending 
to the dispute settlement clause certain disclaimers, qualifications, provisos or 
limitations, such as 'if applicable' or 'where the Convention applies'. This is, for 
example, the case of article 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law of 1999, 
which was discussed in the Mobil and Cemex cases. 
Article 22 provides that: 
Disputes arising between an international investor whose country of origin has in effect with 
Venezuela a treaty or agreement on the promotion and protection of investments, or disputes to 
which the provisions of the Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (OMGI-MIGA) or the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and national of other States (ICSID) are applicable, shall be submitted to international 
arbitration according to the terms of the respective treaty or agreement, if it so provides, without 
prejudice to the possibility of making use, when appropriate, of the dispute resolution means 
provided for under the Venezuelan legislation in effect.43 
See e.g., art. 43 of Zimbabwe's Law on the Promotion of Investment of 1989, Investment Laws of the World, 
ICSID Release 90-2, issued June 1990; art. 18 of Malawi's Investment Promotion Act (No. 28 of 1991), 
Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 93-1, issued June 1993. 
For example on ICSID's website at http^icsid. worldbank.org. 
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, supra n. 38 at para. 331. 
See art. 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law (Decreto No. 356, Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de Ley de 
Promotion y Protection de Inversiones, Official Gazette No. 5.390 (Extraordinary), published 22 October 
1999). The English translation is quoted from CEMEX v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 64 (emphasis added). 
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The tribunals in Mobil and Cemex found that article 22 did not embody consent 
to ICSID arbitration and declined jurisdiction under the Venezuelan statute.44 
The most famous case where a clause of this kind was examined is SPP v. 
Egypt, sometimes referred to as the 'Pyramids case', which appears to be the first 
case brought before ICSID on the basis of a domestic law provision, and which in 
some respects constitutes the landmark case on the topic of consent expressed 
through a domestic law.45 In that case the investor claimed that Egypt had given 
its consent to the Centre's jurisdiction when it enacted Law No. 43 in 1974 and 
that the investor's own consent was expressed in a letter from its managing 
director to Egypt's Minister of Tourism and again by the act of filing its request 
for ICSID arbitration.46 
Article 8 of Law No. 43 of 1974 provided that: 
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provisions of this Law shall be 
settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or within the framework of the 
agreements in force between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the investor's home country, or 
within the framework of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the 
State and the nationals of other countries [sic] to which Egypt has adhered by virtue of Law No. 
90 of 1971, where such Convention applies.47 
Egypt argued that such a provision was not a sufficient basis for the Centre's 
jurisdiction. The tribunal carefully analysed article 8 of Egypt's Foreign 
Investment Law and came to the conclusion that no separate ad hoc 
manifestation of consent between the parties was needed.48 Therefore, it upheld 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
In 1989, following the SPP tribunal's rulings on jurisdiction, Egypt amended its 
Investment Law, by changing the language of the arbitration clause. The new 
version of the Investment Law, contrary to the one on which SPP was able to rely 
On Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law, see Tejera Perez, supra note 2; Andres A. Mezgravis, 'Las 
inversiones petroleras en Venezuela y el arbitraje ante el CIADF in I. de Valera (ed.), Arbitraje comercial interno 
e international, Reftexiones tedricasy experiencias prdcticas (2005), p. 354; Eugenio Hernandez-Breton, 'Proteccion 
de inversiones en Venezuela' in (2005) Derecho del Comercio International Temas y Actualidades (DeCITA) 270; 
Guillaume Lemenez de Kerdelleau, 'State Consent to ICSID Arbitration: Article 22 of the Venezuelan 
Investment Law' in (2007) 4(3) Transnational Dispute Management (June), available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com; Gabriela Alvarez Avila, 'Las caracteristicas del arbitraje del CIADI' in (2002) 2 Anuario 
Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 205 at pp. 211-212, n. 23 (where Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law is 
mentioned precisely as an example of a domestic legislation providing consent to ICSID pursuant to Art. 
25(1) of the ICSID Convention). See also, supra n. 2 for other ICSID cases involving the application of art. 22 
of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law. 
44
 Jurisdiction was conversely affirmed under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. 
45
 Southern Pacfa Properties (Middle East) Ltd (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 27 April 1985, 3 ICSID Rep. 112 ('Decision on Jurisdiction F), and Decision on Jurisdiction, 
14 April 1988, ibid. p. 131 ('Decision on Jurisdiction II'). 
46
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction I, supra n. 45 at para. 48. 
47
 Ibid. para. 70. 
48
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at para. 116. Paulsson, supra n. 10 at p. 235, reports that 
in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt and General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, the 
'claimant investor also successfully relied on this form of legislative consent to ICSID'. A settlement was 
reached in this case after a decision on jurisdiction had been rendered. Ibid. n. 6. 
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in its claim, specified that the reference to ICSID had to be intended not as 
binding consent, but as a mere 'offer to deal', the final decision being left to a 
subsequent agreement between the parties.49 
IV INTERPRETATION OF ICSID CLAUSES C O N T A I N E D 
IN D O M E S T I C LAWS 
(a) Text, Context and Restrictive Interpretation 
The remark that investment laws referring to ICSID may require a careful 
analysis by an arbitral tribunal faced with the issue of ascertaining whether it has 
jurisdiction over a certain case leads us to the question of interpretation of dispute 
setdement clauses contained in such laws. This topic involves addressing various 
questions: what is the correct canon or standard of interpretation to be applied to 
consent to ICSID contained in a domestic law? In case of doubt, should a 
presumption in favour or against consent prevail? Should the investor or the host 
state ultimately bear the risk of ambiguous formulations? 
Any discussion on this topic must begin by considering whether the sources for 
the correct standards of interpretation must be found in the host state's domestic 
principles or directly in international law. Since an investment law or code is part 
of the legislation of a state, one might argue that for this reason a clause included 
therein should be construed in light of the interpretative principles of that state. 
This was basically the stance taken by the dissenting opinion in SPP v. Egypt}0 
However, this perspective does not appear satisfying. 
A legislative provision containing a possible offer to arbitrate before ICSID 
certainly has not only a domestic meaning, but also an international one.51 The 
meaning on the international plane is given by the fact that the offer may create 
an obligation of the state within the legal framework of a multilateral treaty (i.e. 
the ICSID Convention). In other words, an offer contained in a piece of domestic 
legislation aimed at establishing ICSID jurisdiction has to be viewed as a 
unilateral act of the state capable of giving rise to international legal obligations. 
This concept had already been alluded to by the SPP tribunal examining Egypt's 
49
 See art. 55 of Egyptian Investment Law No. 230 of 20 July 1989, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 
90-2, issued June 1990: 'Without prejudice to the right to resort to Egyptian courts, investment disputes 
related to the implementation of the provisions of this Law may be settled in the manner to be agreed upon with 
the investor. The parties concerned may also agree to settle such disputes within the framework of the 
agreements in force between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the investor's home country or within the 
framework of the Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other 
states to which the Arab Republic of Egypt has adhered by Law No. 90 of 1971, subject to the terms and 
conditions, and in the instances where such agreements do apply' (emphasis added). A similar formulation 
can be found in art. 7 of Egypt's subsequent Law No. 8 of 11 May 1997 Promulgating the Law on 
Investment Guarantees and Incentives, Investment Laws of the World, ICSID Release 97-2, issued October 
1997. See also, Delaume, supra n. 4 at pp. 161-163. 
50
 See SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45, Dissenting Opinion of Mohamed Amin El Mahdi, 
3 ICSID Rep. 112 at pp. 163-188, 170 and 177. 
51
 See David Caron, 'The Interpretation of National Foreign Investment Laws as Unilateral Acts under 
International Law' in Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. (eds.), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor 
of W. Michael Reisman (2010), pp. 649-674. 
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Foreign Investment Law when it noted that 'the issue is whether certain 
unilaterally enacted legislation has created an international obligation under a 
multilateral treaty',52 and was expressly confirmed by the tribunals in Mobil v. 
Venezuela and Cemex v. Venezuela?"* Recent scholarship has added a more complete 
theoretical frame to this issue.54 Being a unilateral act under international law, 
such a foreign investment law therefore has to be examined in light of the canons 
of interpretation to be found in international law. This does not mean that 
domestic law considerations will have no role to play at all when assessing such 
legislation. For example, it will be only by referring to domestic law principles and 
rules that one will be able to understand whether that law has already entered 
into force or is still in force (which is an essential element to understanding 
whether consent has been perfected, as previously explained).55 However, given 
the meaning that the law is able to bear on the international plane, international 
law standards of interpretation will ultimately be the ones applicable.56 
52
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at para. 61. 
53
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at paras. 83-85; CEMEX v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at paras. 77-79. 
54
 See, in particular, Caron, supra n. 51. On this topic, see also, Yulia Andreeva, 'Consent to Arbitration as 
a Unilateral Act of State: In Search for a Non-Conventional Approach Towards Treaty Interpretation' in 
I. Laird and T. Weiler (eds.), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (2010), vol. Ill, pp. 59-83. 
55
 See supra. 
56
 See Zhinvali v. Georgia, supra n. 32 at para. 297 ('in applying the ICSID Convention, an ICSID tribunal must 
first, in the absence of express agreement between the parties to the contrary, pay heed to the domestic law 
of the respondent State but then must test the requirements of that domestic law against the tenets of public 
international law to the extent "applicable"') and para. 339 ('if the national law of Georgia addresses this 
question of "consent", which the Tribunal finds that it does, then the Tribunal must follow that national law 
guidance but always subject to ultimate governance by international law'). See also, Mobil v. Venezuela, supra 
n. 3 at para. 85. By the same token, the relevant domestic investment law may have been interpreted by the 
host state's judiciary. This raises the problematic issue of the weight to be attributed by an ICSID tribunal to 
a domestic ruling bearing on the interpretation of that law. ICSID tribunals will obviously be free to take 
into consideration such a purely domestic ruling, but will not at all be bound by its conclusions. See SPP v. 
Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at para. 60 (where the tribunal observed that '[w]hile Egypt's 
interpretation of its own legislation is unquestionably entitled to considerable weight, it cannot control the 
Tribunal's decision as to its own competence. The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and the International Court of Justice makes clear that a sovereign State's interpretation of its own 
unilateral consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is not binding on the tribunal or 
determinative of jurisdictional issues. (The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection, 
PCIJ Series A/B, No. 77, p. 64 (1939); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment [1978] ICJ Rep. 3). Indeed, to 
conclude otherwise would contravene Article 41(1) of the Washington Convention, which provides that: 
"The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence"'). See also, recently, Ahmadou SadioDiallo (Republic of 
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment, 30 November 2010 (where the ICJ held that 'it is for each 
State, in the first instance, to interpret its own domestic law. The Court does not, in principle, have the 
power to substitute its own interpretation for that of the national authorities, especially when that 
interpretation is given by the highest national courts ... Exceptionally, where a State puts forward a 
manifestly incorrect interpretation of its domestic law, particularly for the purpose of gaining an advantage 
in a pending case, it is for the Court to adopt what it finds to be the proper interpretation'). A problem of this 
kind has also arisen in relation to arbitral proceedings where Venezuela's Investment Law is at issue, since 
that law has been the object of a very controversial ruling by Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal. See Judgment 
No. 1541 of 17 October 2008 of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, available at www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/ 
scon/Octubre/1541-171008-08-0763.htm (holding that art. 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law does 
not provide for a unilateral offer to consent to ICSID). The Mobil and CEMEX tribunals, citing to PCIJ/ICJ 
case law, held that the interpretation of art. 22 by Venezuelan authorities or by Venezuelan courts could not 
control the tribunal's decision on its competence. See Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 75 and CEMEX v. 
Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 70. 
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Once more, a passage from the SPP case, dealing exactly with this topic, is 
particularly instructive: 
in deciding whether in the circumstances of the present case Law No. 43 constitutes consent to 
the Centre's jurisdiction, the Tribunal will apply general principles of statutory interpretation 
taking into consideration, where appropriate, relevant rules of treaty interpretation and principles 
of international law applicable to unilateral declarations.51 
The question, therefore, is to determine what are those principles of international 
law applicable to (the interpretation of) unilateral declarations. 
The principle that a written or oral declaration made by a state official, 
without any reciprocal commitment or response and outside the context of formal 
negotiations, may give rise to binding obligations is well established under inter-
national law and was affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
Nuclear Tests cases.58 The ICJ linked the legal effects connected to unilateral 
declarations to the principle of good faith: Just as the very rule of pacta sunt 
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding 
character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration'.59 
The ILC devoted many years of its work to the issue of unilateral acts. The 
topic was included in its agenda in 1996. Special Rapporteur Victor Rodriguez 
Cedefio produced nine reports. In 2006, the ILC adopted 'Guiding Principles 
applicable to unilateral declarations of states capable of creating legal obligations', 
with commentaries thereto ('ILC Guiding Principles').60 It is noteworthy that 
the perspective taken by both the ICJ in Nuclear Tests and by the ILC in its 
codification work is a state-to-state perspective.61 However, there is no reason why 
the same legal principles could not be applied to unilateral declarations made by 
states to private entities, where an investor has reasonably relied on a unilateral 
statement or declaration which a state has made to him.62 It has been pointed out 
that the conclusion that 'a unilateral act has given rise to a binding obligation will 
probably be reinforced if the state making the declaration expects to receive clear 
benefits on the basis of the declaration'.63 This is exacdy the case of investment 
57
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at para. 61 (emphasis added). 
58
 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment [1974] ICJ Rep. 253, para. 43. This paragraph is quoted by the 
ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment [1984] ICJ Rep. 392, para. 59. See also, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 
Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep. 554, paras. 39-40. 
59
 Nuclear Tests, supra n. 58 at para. 46. 
60
 The ILC Guiding Principles can be found at www.un.org/law/ilc. 
61
 Principle 1 of the ILC Guiding Principles reads: 'Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be 
bound may have the effect of creating legal obligations. When the conditions for this are met, the binding 
character of such declarations is based on good faith; States concerned may then take them into 
consideration and rely on them; such States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected'. 
62
 See Michael Reisman and Mahnoush Arsanjiani, 'The Question of Unilateral Governmental Statements as 
Applicable Law in Investment Disputes' in P.M. Dupuy, B. Fassbender, M. Shaw and K.P. Sommermann 
(eds.), Vb'lkerrecht als Wertordnung [Common Values in International Law], Festschrift Jur Christian Tomuschat [Essays in 
Honour of Christian Tomuschat] (2006), p. 409 at pp. 419, 422 (citing to Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, 
Award, 24 August 1978, (1978) 17 ILM 1321 at p. 1331). 
63
 Reisman and Arsanjiani, supra n. 62 at p. 416. 
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laws, which are enacted by a state with the precise aim of attracting foreign 
capital to boost the country's economy. Therefore, the ILC's Guiding Principles 
would appear, at least in principle, also applicable to domestic laws including an 
offer to arbitrate before ICSID, given the nature of a unilateral act possibly 
binding the state on the international plane.64 
In its work on unilateral acts, the ILC also addressed the issue of interpretation 
of such acts. 
Principle 7 of the ILC Guiding Principles, last sentence, reads: 'In interpreting 
the content of such obligations, weight shall be given first and foremost to the text 
of the declaration, together with the context and the circumstances in which it 
was formulated'. The analogy to the rule of interpretation of treaties contained in 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is evident.65 
The idea of an application by analogy of the rules of interpretation derived from 
the Vienna Convention appears also from the commentary accompanying the 
final text of the ILC Guiding Principles, as well as from some of the Special 
Rapporteur's reports.66 
Following the ILC guideline contained in Principle 7, an arbitral tribunal faced 
with the task of interpreting a dispute setdement clause included in a domestic 
law would 'first and foremost' have to embark on a textual analysis of the 
provision. As recognised by the SPP tribunal, '[tjhe starting point in statutory 
interpretation, as in the interpretation of treaties and unilateral declarations, is 
the ordinary or grammatical meaning of the terms used'.67 The analysis will 
likely aim at understanding whether the reference to ICSID jurisdiction is 
formulated in mandatory terms or, on the contrary, subject to a further 
manifestation of will by the state. In this respect, the particular usage of verbs 
('shall', 'must', 'may', etc.) might be taken into consideration. For instance, in SPP 
the tribunal focused on the 'shall be setded' language in article 8 of the Egyptian 
Investment Law (as opposed to 'may be' which had been used in a different 
paragraph of the same law), and concluded, relying also on a dictum of the ICJ,68 
that such expression mandated the submission of disputes to the various methods 
prescribed therein (as opposed to making them purely optional and subject to a 
64
 It must be noted that the ILC in its work on unilateral declarations of states did not take foreign investment 
laws into consideration. On this, see Caron, supra n. 51 at pp. 668-671. 
65
 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: 'A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose'. 
66
 See para. 3 of the commentary under Principle 7 of the ILC Guiding Principles; see also, Victor Rodriguez 
Cedefto, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on Unilateral Acts of States, UN Doc. A/CN.4/519 (30 May 2001), 
paras. 101-152. See also, Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 96. On the issue of interpretation of dispute 
settlement clauses contained in investment treaties, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Interpretation of 
Treaties: How Do Arbitral Tribunals Interpret Dispute Settlement Provisions Embodied in Investment 
Treaties?' in L. Mistelis and J. Lew (eds.), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (2006), p. 257. 
67
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at para. 74. 
68
 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory 
Opinion of 8 June 1960, [1960] ICJ Rep. 150 at p. 159 (where the ICJ held that the words 'shall be' were 
'on their face ... mandatory'). 
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further consent by the state).69 The textual analysis of the relevant domestic law 
provision was also the starting point in Mobil and Cemex.70 
Secondly, the ILC Guiding Principles direct the interpreter to 'give weight' to 
the 'context and circumstances' in which the unilateral act was formulated. 
Although in this regard the ILC did not appear to have incorporated the 'object 
and purpose' language pursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention,71 it 
might not be overlooked (as part of the 'context' in which the dispute settlement 
provision is inserted) that the law containing the clause is intended to promote 
and protect foreign investments (exactly in the same way as does a BIT).72 And of 
course the right to resort to an independent forum for the resolution of disputes 
such as ICSID would seem to be part (if not the core) of the legal protection to 
which investors aspire. This observation, however, should not be overstated: the 
emphasis on the 'context' formed by the investment law as a whole should not 
lead the interpreter to automatically conclude in favour of ICSID jurisdiction. 
A state may be willing to offer the broadest substantive safeguards to foreign 
investors (in terms of standards of treatment, protection from expropriation, etc.), 
but might want to withhold procedural rights, exacdy as happens in certain 
BITs.73 
Finally, the ILC provided a rule of interpretation in the event that there is a 
'doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from [a unilateral] declaration'. 
Due to its 'residual' nature ('in the case of doubt'), it would have probably 
appeared more logical to have this rule close, rather than open, Principle 7. Be 
that as it may, Principle 7 in its first two sentences reads: 
A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear 
and specific terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a 
declaration, such obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. 
This rule of restrictive interpretation has been marked by Professor Caron as a 
'departure from the approach of the Vienna Convention to interpretation'.74 The 
same author has argued that 'this principle does not appear to have been settled 
upon having in mind, or to appear justified in the case of, the interpretation of a 
deliberate written piece of legislation pertaining to either a national foreign 
investment law or a consent to ICSID jurisdiction'.75 
The argument for a restrictive interpretation of consent clauses is in fact not at 
all unknown in ICSID arbitrations: on the contrary it is a 'recurrent theme in the 
69
 SPPv. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction II, supra n. 45 at paras. 74-82. 
70
 Mobilv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at paras. 97-111; CEMEX v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at paras. 90-103. 
71
 On this, see extensively, Caron, supra n. 51 at pp. 662-663 (also detailing discussions amongst ILC members on 
the 'object and purpose' language). 
72
 See Zhinvali v. Georgia, supra n. 32 at para. 335 (where the tribunal considered 'the purpose as well as the 
context' of art. 16(2) of Georgia's Foreign Investment Law). 
73
 For a discussion of art. 22 in relation to the 'context and purpose' of the Venezuelan Foreign Investment 
Law, see CEMEX v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at paras. 116-126. 
74
 Caron, supra note 51 at p. 665. 
75
 Ibid. 
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pleadings' by respondent states.76 However, it has generally been considered not 
to be germane to ICSID arbitration by arbitral tribunals who have taken a much 
more 'balanced' approach. With the probably sole exception of a short passage in 
Tradex v. Albania, where the tribunal appeared to lean more towards an extensive 
interpretation of consent,77 tribunals have usually taken the 'neither broad nor 
restrictive approach'.78 A passage from the award in Amco Asia et al. v. Indonesia 
(dealing with consent arising out of an agreement between the parties) is 
frequently cited to by other arbitral tribunals dealing with the interpretation of 
consent.79 In Amco, the tribunal noted that: 
In the first place, like any other conventions, a convention to arbitrate is not to be construed 
restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It is to be construed in a way which 
leads to find out and to respect the common will of the parties ... Moreover - and this is again 
a general principle of law - any convention, including conventions to arbitrate, should be 
construed in good faith, that is to say by taking into account the consequences of their 
commitments the parties may be considered as having reasonably and legitimately envisaged.80 
In the specific area of interpretation of consent clauses in domestic laws, the 
SPP tribunal observed that: 
jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, but rather 
objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if- but only if- the force of 
the arguments militating in favor of it is preponderant.81 
Interestingly, the tribunals in Mobil and Cemex made reference to the ILC 
Guiding Principles and to the standard of restrictive interpretation contained 
76
 See Schreuer et al., supra n. 4 at p. 251. 
11
 Tradex Hellas v. Albania, supra n. 13 at p. 194 ('It would, therefore, seem appropriate to at least take into 
account, though not as a decisive factor by itself but rather as a confirming factor, that in case of doubt the 
1993 Law should rather be interpreted in favour of investor protection and in favour of ICSID jurisdiction 
in particular'). Those who argue in favour of a broad interpretation of consent typically make use of the 
canon of 'effective interpretation', whereby a clause in a legal text is to be interpreted in a meaningful rather 
than in a meaningless way. See Schreuer et al, supra n. 4 at p. 251; Tejera Perez, supra n. 2 at p. 113. See also, 
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in the interpretation of unilateral acts). 
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therein,82 but appeared to deny that these principles ought to be applied to the 
interpretation of article 22 of Venezuela's Foreign Investment Law.83 In fact, the 
principle of restrictive interpretation appeared to play no role at all in the final 
decision by the two tribunals. 
In their analyses on the correct standard of interpretation of a domestic piece 
of legislation embodying an offer to arbitrate, the two tribunals gave predominant 
weight to the ICJ case law on the interpretation of unilateral declarations, in 
particular optional declarations of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made 
under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. Both tribunals recalled the ICJ's dicta 
whereby a unilateral declaration 'must be interpreted as it stands, having regard 
to the words actually used',84 and that due consideration should be paid to the 
intention of the state having formulated such acts, which can be deduced from the 
'context', 'the circumstances of its preparation' and the 'purposes intended to be 
served'.85 To be entirely clear, the Cemex tribunal stated that 'the intention of the 
declaring State must prevail'.86 When the arbitrators in the two cases turned to 
the search for Venezuela's intention, they looked at several factors, including 
Venezuela's historical attitude vis-a-vis arbitration and the (lacking) legislative 
history of the statute, both of which did not provide conclusive evidence on the 
state's intention to submit investment disputes to mandatory arbitration. Finally, 
the tribunal noted that by looking at BITs entered into by Venezuela one could 
find evidence of clauses crafted in a more mandatory way. Thus, 'if it had been 
the intention of Venezuela to give its advance consent to ICSID arbitration in 
general, it would have been easy for the drafters of Article 22 to express that 
intention clearly by using any of those well known formulas'.87 
Thus, the two ICSID tribunals drew a complete analogy with the regime 
applicable to the interpretation of declarations made under Article 36(2) of the ICJ 
Statute. It could, however, be questioned whether an indiscriminate analogy 
between an ICJ optional clause declaration and a foreign investment law (and the 
consequent emphasis placed on the search for the state's 'intention' behind the 
declaration) might always lead to fully satisfactory results. It might be a very hard 
task to ascertain what the real intent behind a piece of legislation is, especially if (as 
was the case with Venezuela) there are no travaux preparatoires or other official 
reports which could shed light on the drafters' intention. In such a case, it might 
be questioned whether greater emphasis should be placed on this subjective 
element or rather on the 'context' in which the dispute settlement provision was 
82
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 89; CEMEXv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 82. 
83
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 90 and CEMEXv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 83 (noting that the rules 
of interpretation applicable to consent contained in a domestic law provision are 'somewhat different' to the 
ones formulated by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests and Armed Activities cases and adopted by the ILC in its 
Guiding Principles, due to the fact that an offer of consent to ICSID contained in a domestic law is a 
unilateral declaration 'formulated in the framework of a treaty and on the basis of such a treaty'). 
84
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 92; CEMEX v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 85. 
85
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 94; CEMEXv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 87. 
86
 CEMEXv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 87. 
87
 Mobil v. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 139. See also, CEMEXv. Venezuela, supra n. 3 at para. 137 (in almost 
identical terms). 
The Interpretation of Consent to ICSID Arbitration Contained 167 
inserted, that is, a law enacted with the specific aim of attracting foreign capital 
into the host state. In relation to this, it might also be useful to evaluate how the 
dispute settlement clause has been perceived, reasonably and in good faith, by its 
natural addressee, the foreign investors. The ILC Guiding Principles, which direct 
the interpreter to take account, amongst other factors, also of the 'reactions' to 
which the unilateral declaration gave rise, could be, once more, of support here.88 
(b) Good Faith and the Duty to Avoid Ambiguities 
As already noted, die ICJ linked the binding character of an international obligation 
assumed by unilateral declaration to the principle of good faith.89 Principle 1 of the 
ILC Guiding Principles also states that 'the binding character of such declarations is 
based on good faith'. Tribunals have many times called for an interpretation in 
good faith of jurisdictional instruments.90 The ICSID tribunal in SOABIv. Senegal, 
dealing with consent contained in an agreement between the state and the investor, 
stressed the need to take into account investors' legitimate expectations: 
In the Tribunal's opinion, an arbitration agreement must be given, just as with any other 
agreement, an interpretation consistent with the principle of good faith. In other words, the 
interpretation must take into account the consequences which the parties must reasonably and 
legitimately be considered to have envisaged as flowing from their undertakings. It is this 
principle of interpretation, rather than one of a priori strict, or, for that matter, broad and liberal 
construction, that the Tribunal has chosen to apply.91 
To interpret in good faith means to avoid unintended and literal 
interpretations of words that might result in one of the parties gaining an unfair 
or unjust advantage over another party.92 Good faith requires an arbitral tribunal 
to examine whether foreign investors have formed any reasonable and legitimate 
expectations as to the availability of ICSID remedies pursuant to a domestic law. 
In this regard, it has been argued that the risk of ambiguities capable of 
misleading investors should be borne by the host state which has enacted 
equivocally worded legislation.93 
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Lack of transparency and abuse of intentional ambiguities are discouraged 
in investment law. Late Professor Thomas Walde's Separate Opinion in the 
Thunderbird v. Mexico case represents perhaps the best elucidation of the principles 
of transparency and legitimate expectations in international investment law: 
The implications of the obligation to be clear and avoid ambiguity is that the government agency 
has to bear the risk of its own ambiguity. This allocation of the risk of ambiguity requires that 
the investor did and could reasonably have confidence in die assurance, not as an ultra-perfect 
lawyer equipped with a hindsight vision facility, but as a reasonable businessman in the position 
of die investor would do in the particular circumstances.94 
To use die term employed by the ICJ in Nuclear Tests,^ a foreign investor may 
have placed 'confidence' in the existence of a standing offer to arbitrate before 
ICSID contained in the host state's domestic law. Therefore, it would appear 
logical for an ICSID tribunal involved with the question of interpretation of such 
a clause to consider whether such confidence was reasonable. The question is 
likely to be discussed at length by both parties to the dispute during the 
jurisdictional phase of the arbitral proceedings. 
V C O N C L U S I O N S 
In conclusion, the analysis of a domestic law provision possibly embodying 
consent to ICSID's jurisdiction is an important task to be performed carefully 
both by the parties and the arbitrators. A state's consent to ICSID arbitration 
should never be presumed.96 The claimant bears the burden of proving that there 
is a positive basis for consent in that given case. Rule 2 of the Centre's Rules of 
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings 
provides that the request for arbitration must be supported by documentation 
concerning the instruments recording consent and their dates.97 It is therefore of 
utmost importance for the investor to be able to persuade the tribunal that the 
'unilateral act' constituted by the offer to arbitrate is formulated in binding terms. 
This article has attempted to provide a possible path which can be followed in the 
task of interpreting such domestic provisions. The critical role of investors' 
legitimate expectations has been highlighted. Of course, there is no exhaustive list 
of evidence which claimants may resort to in order to show that the host state has 
created legitimate expectations in them as to the possibility of having recourse to 
ICSID arbitration. The binding effect of the unilateral act contained in the 
domestic law may, for instance, be reinforced if the claimant is able to rely on 
94
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advertisements by the host state's government (made to that single investor or erga 
omnes) on the availability of arbitral mechanisms. Legislative history on the 
provision may also be used as a fact on which the investor may have relied in 
good faith. The Tradex tribunal also took into account in its analysis of the consent 
clause the fact that there had been previous consecutive investment laws in 
Albania formulated in different terms.98 
Although in a possible dispute with the host state, investors (and their lawyers) 
will likely look first to standards of protection contained in BITs or multilateral 
treaties, the importance of domestic investment laws as tools providing guarantees 
to private companies should not be overlooked. With particular regard to 
international arbitration, consent to ICSID may be found to the same degree in 
a treaty as in a piece of domestic legislation. At times, consent to ICSID 
contained in investment laws may even be the only recourse available where the 
investor's state of nationality has not entered into a BIT with the host state. 
Because of nationality restrictions or other possible limitations envisaged by BITs 
(such as waiting periods), a domestic provision granting jurisdiction to the Centre 
may therefore be regarded as the only gateway to an independent forum such as 
ICSID. 
98
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